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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The question of whether there is any value to the temporary storage of 
carbon is fundamental to climate policy design across a number of arenas, 
including physical carbon discounting in greenhouse gas accounting, the 
relative value of temporary carbon offsets, and the value of other carbon 
mitigation efforts that are known to be impermanent, including deferred 
deforestation. Quantifying the value of temporary carbon storage depends 
on a number of assumptions about how the incremental impact (or social 
cost) of a given ton of carbon emissions is expected to change over time. In 
2009, a U.S. government interagency working group was established and 
assigned the responsibility of calculating social cost of carbon estimates to 
be used in benefi t/cost analysis of regulations impacting carbon dioxide 
emissions. Those estimates were released in March 2010. This working 
paper explores what those estimates imply about the value of temporary 
carbon storage, as well as the implications of those temporary storage 
values for several critical policy design questions relating to greenhouse 
gas accounting and biological offsets. This analysis suggests, for instance, 
that appropriate physical carbon discount rates for carbon accounting may 
be even lower than the social discount rates often used in intergenerational 
analyses. In the context of agricultural offsets, the social cost of carbon 
estimates are used to establish a defi nition of equivalence between perma-
nent and temporary offsets; equivalence ratios are derived that vary 
between ~2 and 30, depending on the discount rate used and the length of 
the temporary offset contract period.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the question: Is there any reason to invest in mitigation projects 
that will capture carbon today and then release an equivalent amount of 
carbon in 50 years? 
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This question asks whether there is any value to the 
temporary storage of carbon. Note that the question 
excludes many of the common contexts in which concepts 
of “temporary storage” or “impermanence” are debated. 
For instance, the question is not relevant to the “risk of 
reversal” discussion, which focuses on quantifying how the 
risk of premature release of carbon (i.e., before the end of a 
contract period) impacts the value and integrity of an 
offset, as well as on designing mechanisms to prevent (or 
compensate for) such releases at the national or project 
scale. This analysis assumes that storage reversal will 
occur with 100 percent certainty at the end of the project 
period but, conversely, that the carbon will remain stored 
for the project duration of 50 years. As posed, the question 
explores the fundamental issue of whether there is value to 
storage that is known to be temporary. 
This discussion paper explores the issues and implications 
associated with temporary carbon storage in an attempt to 
articulate whether or not temporary carbon storage has a 
value, what the nature of that value is, and how it can be 
used to inform policy design in a variety of relevant arenas 
for greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting and climate policy. 
Specifi cally, this paper explores the implications of a 
positive valuation of temporary storage in three contexts: 
lifecycle GHG accounting for biofuels, agricultural offsets 
accounting, and deferred emissions from reduced defores-
tation and forest degradation (REDD) mechanisms.
II. THE VALUE OF TEMPORARY CARBON STORAGE: 
CLARIFYING THE TERMS
While there is no consensus on the matter, several authors 
have argued in favor of a positive value for temporary 
storage of carbon. The literature has cited reasons such as:
1. “buying time” for learning, technological advancement 
and deployment, or capital turnover (Marland et al., 
2001);
2. slowing the rise of temperature and therefore delaying 
the impacts of climate change (Dornburg and Marland, 
2008);
3. altering the path of emissions in other ways—smoothing 
out the path of emissions and avoiding peaks—that allow 
us to delay impacts (Dornburg and Marland, 2008); and
4. creating potential for temporary storage to become 
permanent (Chomitz, 2000).
For the moment, this analysis is concerned only with the 
original question about whether temporary storage has a 
value in and of itself, and therefore eliminates the last 
reason from discussion and focuses instead on the fi rst 
three. 
There is a fundamental distinction between the fi rst reason 
given above and the next two. The second and third 
reasons both refer to the impacts arising from changing the 
time path of damages incurred by emissions. The “time-
path” argument reasons that if temporarily withholding a 
unit of emissions changes the path of emissions in a way 
that delays impacts, then aggregate damages from emis-
sions will go down: “Temporary sinks slow the rise of 
temperature during their maintenance, and, thus, shorten 
the time of climate change impacts. In an analysis that 
‘treats climate-change impacts in any year as equally 
important,’ the cumulative temperature impact will always 
be favorable for temporary sinks” (Dornburg and Marland, 
2008). 
According to this argument, the value of temporary storage 
arises through impacting the cumulative value of damages 
incurred; if we delay the onset of those damages, the value 
of damages in aggregate goes down. This type of value to 
temporary carbon storage would be manifested in a 
declining social cost of carbon over time. The social cost of 
carbon (SCC) refers to the cost of the damage done through 
the emission of a unit of carbon dioxide (Tol, 2008). That 
value is also, analogously, the value or benefi t associated 
with preventing a unit of carbon dioxide) emissions.2 If the 
social cost of carbon is declining, it means that a unit of 
emissions will add less to the aggregate damage done by 
carbon dioxide emissions if it is postponed. In this context, 
the value of temporary storage derives from the reduced 
costs associated with delayed or “smoothed” carbon 
dioxide stock buildup. 
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The “buying time” argument for temporary storage value 
addresses the fl ip side of the carbon challenge. Rather than 
addressing how the benefi ts of reducing emissions change 
over time with atmospheric stocks and damages infl icted, 
the value of “buying time” for compliance arises from how 
the costs of reducing emissions are expected to change 
over time. This argument asserts that, given that we know 
we want to reduce greenhouse gas emissions permanently, 
it may be less costly in the long run to engage in temporary 
reductions now, and then make those reductions permanent 
at lower cost later, when new technology has been devel-
oped or can be adopted in conjunction with natural capital 
turnover cycles. The value of the temporary reductions in 
those cases derives from the ability to ultimately make 
permanent reductions more cost-effectively; that value is 
fundamentally different from the “smoothing” value 
described above, where temporary reductions themselves 
carry a value. According to the “buying time” argument, 
the value of temporary storage derives from the value of 
delayed investment in permanent storage.
For clarity, we will refer to the values arising from delayed 
carbon stock damages as the “value of temporary storage,” 
with the assumption that such storage is in fact temporary 
and ends at the end of the storage project period. In 
contrast, the value arising from increased fl exibility to cost-
effectively achieve permanent reductions over time will be 
referred to as the “value of interim storage.” In the latter 
case, the implication is that the path of emissions reduction 
will remain unbroken, but that the form of that reduction is 
likely to change from the interim project to a more perma-
nent reduction at some point. 
Such a distinction is important because the pathways 
generating the values are completely different, as are the 
methods used to estimate them. In the following sections 
we explore in more detail the complexities of measuring 
the value of temporary storage, the proxies used to repre-
sent them in policy, the policy arenas in which some of 
these debates are playing out, and the policy implications 
of the uncertainty associated with those measurements. An 
in-depth exploration of the value of interim storage is not 
covered in this working paper.
III. THE VALUE OF TEMPORARY STORAGE: THE 
SOCIAL COST OF CARBON
Rising atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have 
been implicated in costly geophysical changes ranging 
from rising sea level to changing precipitation patterns, 
including increased frequency of catastrophic weather 
events such as hurricanes and drought (IPCC, 2007). Such 
fi ndings support the general conclusion that the social cost 
of carbon is positive, that is, that there is a cost to society 
associated with the emissions of greenhouse gases. There 
are therefore potential benefi ts to be derived from curtail-
ing carbon emissions and from policies that impose or 
incentivize such constraints.3 No consensus exists, how-
ever, about what the precise value of that social cost fi gure 
is (Tol, 2008). An extensive history of economic analysis 
on the topic has illuminated the complexities of the issue 
but has failed to arrive at a consensus value due to the 
signifi cant levels of uncertainty surrounding the derivation 
of actual estimates. 
A signifi cant portion of that complexity arises from the 
dynamics associated with carbon emissions and impacts. 
Carbon’s persistence in the atmosphere, for instance, 
means that evaluating the full impact of a current unit of 
emissions requires an understanding of the present dam-
ages associated with an additional unit of carbon in the 
atmosphere, as well as how those damages will change 
over the lifetime of that unit in the atmosphere. 
There are two relevant time horizons in the calculation and 
use of social cost of carbon estimates in evaluating the 
greenhouse gas impacts of a project or product (Marshall, 
2009). The fi rst, the “impact horizon,” refers to the period 
of time over which warming impacts occur when a unit of 
carbon is emitted. The second relevant time horizon is the 
“project horizon,” or the period of time over which a 
project or regulation results in changes of emissions and 
emissions timing (Figure 1). In the context of greenhouse 
gas accounting at the project or product level, it is often 
necessary to aggregate carbon emissions over time in 
determining net carbon impacts. The greenhouse gas 
emissions changes associated with a project, especially 
those involving land-use change, often occur over a long 
period of time. Any attempt to compare emissions over 
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time, in order to weight and aggregate them according to 
some measure of relative impact, requires an understanding 
of how the value of the damage caused by a unit of 
emissions in the future will compare to the value of 
damage caused by a unit of emissions today. 
Figure 1 illustrates a case where the social cost of carbon is 
calculated for emissions in two different time periods, 
which are denoted t1 and t2. The social costs of carbon 
assigned to the emissions, which are denoted A and B, 
respectively, are calculated by estimating and aggregating 
emissions impacts over the “impact horizon” (denoted TIH). 
The purpose of aggregating over that time horizon is to 
associate a unit of carbon emissions in a given period with 
a single measure of damage that refl ects the “cost” of that 
unit of emissions over time, or, conversely, the “benefi t” of 
preventing that unit of emissions in that time period. 
There are several variables that affect the path of expected 
damage from a unit of emissions. One of these is the rate at 
which atmospheric carbon decays as carbon is re-absorbed 
into biotic sinks such as forests and oceans, which defi nes 
the form and duration of a unit of emissions’ residence 
period in the atmosphere. The way in which this decay is 
represented varies, with some authors using a fi xed decay 
rate applied to atmospheric stocks (Richards, 1997) and 
others using an exponential decay function that refl ects a 
declining rate of carbon decay over time (Fearnside, 
2000a). In both cases, the decay function refl ects the purely 
physical dynamic of the persistence of carbon in the 
atmosphere over the impact horizon and translates a unit of 
emissions into an atmospheric carbon stock impact over 
time.4
The second relationship defi ning the path of damage 
expected from a unit of emissions is the relationship 
between carbon stock and the damage expected from that 
stock. This relationship translates the physical stock 
dynamic described by the decay function into a measure of 
the cost implications of that stock response and moves the 
“impact horizon” into the realm of economic impact 
measurement. There are many simplifying assumptions 
used in different analyses of carbon stock damage over 
time, including the assumption that marginal damages are 
not stock-dependent at all or that they are linearly related 
to stock, but the reality of this relationship is likely more 
complicated than such assumptions suggest. Recent 
attempts to represent this relationship in derived estimates 
of social cost of carbon have relied upon complicated 
integrated assessment models designed to capture the 
interactions of multiple underlying variables (Federal 
Interagency Working Group, 2010).
Each unit of emissions is therefore associated with a path 
of expected damages over time that refl ects both the impact 
of that unit on atmospheric carbon stocks over time and the 
Figure 1 | There are two distinct rounds of discounting involved in the calculation and use of social cost of carbon estimates 
(represented by A and B).
Estimates of marginal damage discounted and aggregated back over impact horizon to a single figure A 
associated with emissions in time t1 and B associated with emissions reductions in time t2.
Per-period estimates of marginal damage (A, B, etc.) 
discounted back to present to calculate net carbon 
impact of emissions changes over project jorizon
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impact of those carbon stocks on damages from climate 
change over time. That damage path can then be aggre-
gated over the impact horizon to produce a single social 
cost of carbon estimate of the expected costs associated 
with a unit of emissions in a given time period, as denoted 
by A and B in Figure 1. Because the path of damages is 
expressed in monetary terms, a discount term is often 
employed as part of the aggregation to “weight” damages 
in different time periods according to a judgment about 
how and whether the value of a dollar of damages changes 
over time (see Box 1).
Once a path of emission damages has been condensed into 
a single cost of carbon estimate for units of emissions (or a 
single benefi t number associated with an avoided ton of 
emissions) in each time period, a second round of aggre-
gating often occurs. In the second round, the purpose of the 
aggregation is to calculate a single total present value of 
all the carbon emission costs and avoided emission benefi ts 
that occur over the project horizon (denoted TPH in Figure 
1). This process compares the value of carbon benefi t and 
cost dollars in different time periods, weights them using a 
discount rate, and then aggregates them to a single number 
representing total value expressed in present value terms 
(Figure 1). 
The second round of aggregation is a fairly straightforward 
process of discounting cost and benefi t fi gures over a fi nite 
time horizon using economic discounting. The discount 
factor selected should be internally consistent with the 
discount factor used to calculate the social cost of carbon 
in the fi rst round of discounting. Some argue that, in the 
case of a constant discount rate, the rate should therefore 
be the same in the two discounting periods (Federal 
Interagency Working Group, 2010). 
Calculation of the social cost of carbon involves a great 
deal of uncertainty in the form of uncertain future damage 
functions, atmospheric carbon stock levels, emissions 
trajectories, etc. Despite this uncertainty, delays in address-
ing atmospheric carbon buildup lead to higher levels of risk 
of catastrophic impacts and damages (Stern, 2007), so 
climate policy design continues to move forward to address 
the unfolding impacts of climate change. Many climate 
policies, however, rely on some understanding of the 
magnitude of the social cost of carbon, and of underlying 
assumptions about how marginal damages change over 
time, to ensure that the policies provide the proper incen-
tives or the proper level of control. Establishment of 
estimates of the SCC, and design of mechanisms for 
Box 1 | Dollars and Discounting
Economic analyses generally assume that dollars are not 
worth the same amount in different time periods. According 
to this assumption, loss of a dollar in 2050 may not be 
equivalent, in terms of impact, to loss of a dollar today. If, 
for instance, it is possible to invest a dollar in an invest-
ment vehicle that earns a guaranteed 4 percent interest, 
then today’s dollar will emerge from that investment vehicle 
in 2050 having grown in value to ~$4.80. In this scenario, 
a dollar today is more valuable than a dollar in 2050 
because there are opportunities to augment the value of 
today’s dollar through market investment. A dollar today is, 
in a sense, equivalent to $4.80 in the future. Similarly, if 
one invests $0.21 in that investment vehicle, it will emerge 
in 2050 as worth ~$1.00, so a dollar from 2050 is, in a 
sense, equivalent to $0.21 today. 
This definition of equivalency (one calculated based on 
opportunities for market investment) is only one of many 
that are used to evaluate the changing value of money over 
time. A great deal of economic literature is dedicated to 
describing other justifications for assuming that the value 
of a dollar changes over time, and what the implications of 
those theories are for definitions of equivalency and 
selection of an appropriate discount rate. 
In all cases, however, converting the value of a dollar in the 
future to a present value dollar requires advancing some 
definition of equivalency and using a discount rate that 
reflects that equivalency to calculate backwards from future 
values to present values. While there is often consensus 
that economic decision making should assume some type 
of changing dollar value over time, there is more disagree-
ment about what underlies that changing value, and often 
significant disagreement about what discount rate is 
therefore appropriate.
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dealing with the uncertainty inherent in those numbers, will 
therefore be a critical element in the development of 
effective climate policy.
U.S. Interagency Working Group Social Cost of Carbon 
Estimates
In 2009, a governmental interagency working group was 
established and assigned the responsibility of calculating 
social cost of carbon estimates to be used in benefi t/cost 
analysis of regulations impacting carbon dioxide emis-
sions. The working group relied on three integrated 
assessment models (the FUND, DICE, and PAGE models) 
to generate estimates of the monetized damages of climate 
change impacts associated with carbon dioxide emissions 
in various time periods. Because such values are extremely 
sensitive to the discount rate chosen to aggregate impacts 
over the residence period (or “lifetime”) of a unit of carbon 
in the atmosphere, and because there is so much disagree-
ment about selection of an appropriate discount rate, the 
working group generated social cost of carbon estimates 
for three different discounting scenarios: a 2.5 percent, 3 
percent, and a 5 percent discount rate.5 To illustrate the 
uncertainty associated with the SCC estimates, the working 
group also presented a set of SCC estimates that represents 
the 95 percentile estimates for the 3 percent discount rate 
scenario. These numbers represent the upper tail of the 
distribution of impacts, and they are roughly three times 
the estimates that represent the average of the potential 
impact distribution (Table 1).
Table 1 | Estimated social cost of carbon figures for 
regulatory analysis ($/ton CO2).
Emission 
Year
5% 
discount rate 
(Average)
3% 
discount rate 
(Average)
2.5% 
discount rate 
(Average)
3% 
discount rate 
(95th Percentile)
2010 4.7 21.4 35.1 64.9
2015 5.7 23.8 38.4 72.8
2020 6.8 26.3 41.7 80.7
2025 8.2 29.6 45.9 90.4
2030 9.7 32.8 50.0 100.0
2035 11.2 36.0 54.2 109.7
2040 12.7 39.2 58.4 119.3
2045 14.2 42.1 61.7 127.8
2050 15.7 44.9 65.0 136.2
The increasing social cost of carbon over time for all the 
scenarios arises because “future emissions are expected to 
produce larger incremental damages as physical and 
economic systems become more stressed in response to 
greater climate change” (Federal Interagency Working 
Group, 2010). Note, however, that these values for SCC 
are expressed in future-year terms; the value of the SCC in 
2050 assuming a 3 percent discount rate is projected to be 
$44.90/ton of CO2. Expressing those 2050 values in 
“present value” terms requires discounting them back to 
the present using an appropriate discount rate. The working 
group argues that in converting future-year values to 
present values “damages from future emissions should be 
discounted at the same rate as that used to calculate the 
SCC estimates themselves to ensure internal consistency.” 
Applying the respective discount rates to the social costs of 
carbon estimates assigned to a unit of emissions in each 
future time period yields the present value of the social 
cost of carbon estimates shown in Table 2.
Table 2 | The present value of estimated SCC figures ($/
ton CO2).
Emission 
Year
5% 
discount rate 
(Average)
3% 
discount rate 
(Average)
2.5% 
discount rate 
(Average)
3% 
discount rate 
(95th Percentile)
2010 4.7 21.4 35.1 64.9
2015 4.5 20.5 33.9 62.8
2020 4.2 19.6 32.6 60.0
2025 3.9 19.0 31.7 58.0
2030 3.7 18.2 30.5 55.4
2035 3.3 17.2 29.2 52.4
2040 2.9 16.1 27.8 49.2
2045 2.6 15.0 26.0 45.4
2050 2.2 13.8 24.2 41.8
Note that when expressed in “present value” terms, the 
value of the SCC is declining over time in all cases. This 
decline occurs because the rate of growth of the social 
damage estimates shown in Table 1 (i.e., the rate of 
increase of the cost to society of carbon emissions over 
time) is lower than the discount rate used to discount the 
values back to the present. If the value of damages is 
growing more slowly than the value of current investments 
(as refl ected in the discount rate used), it is theoretically 
possible to invest the value of “foregone damages” (at a 
return equal to the discount rate used) and have it grow 
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faster than damages. The result will be an investment that 
is large enough to compensate for the value of future social 
damages. 
The working group’s results can therefore be used to 
estimate present values for the temporary storage of carbon 
(foregoing damages early but incurring them later when 
stored carbon is released). Table 3 shows the estimated 
per-ton value of storing carbon from 2010 until the release 
date listed. For example, if a 5 percent discount rate is 
selected, the value of storing a ton of carbon from 2010 
until 2050, and subsequently releasing it, is $2.47; in other 
words, the present value of the costs associated with a ton 
of carbon released are lowered by $2.47 if that unit of 
emissions is delayed from 2010 until 2050. 
Table 3 | Estimated per-ton present value of storing carbon 
from 2010 until the release date listed ($/ton CO2).
Emission 
Year
5% 
discount rate 
(Average)
3% 
discount rate 
(Average)
2.5% 
discount rate 
(Average)
3% 
discount rate 
(95th Percentile)
2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2015 0.23 0.87 1.16 2.10
2020 0.53 1.83 2.52 4.85
2025 0.76 2.40 3.41 6.88
2030 1.04 3.24 4.59 9.53
2035 1.39 4.21 5.87 12.51
2040 1.76 5.25 7.26 15.75
2045 2.13 6.44 9.10 19.48
2050 2.47 7.64 10.89 23.15
According to the path of SCC estimates derived by the 
interagency working group, there is always a positive value 
to temporary storage of carbon (Table 3). These fi gures 
suggest that there are positive benefi ts to society of storing 
carbon now, even if it is released later. That value increases 
with the length of storage and is highly sensitive to the 
discount rate and structure selected. Also according to these 
estimates, the value of temporary storage declines as the 
discount rate increases; the higher the discount rate, the 
lower the SCC in any time period, because future damages 
are more heavily discounted. The more heavily the future is 
discounted, the lower the value that is attached in the present 
to the damage that future carbon emissions are assumed to 
cause, and the less value there is to delaying those damages.6
The following sections discuss some of the arenas in which 
the concept of social cost of carbon plays an important role 
in policy and regulation design in general, as well as the 
implications for those issues of using the new regulatory 
social cost of carbon fi gures as estimates of the temporary 
value of carbon under different discounting and uncertainty 
scenarios.
IV. RELEVANT POLICY ARENAS
The importance of the concept of temporary storage, and 
how relative values of emissions at different points in time 
compare, plays out across a number of different policy 
arenas, including: 
•  Biofuels greenhouse gas accounting: Accounting for 
paths of carbon emissions associated with biofuels 
production in assigning a single greenhouse gas content 
fi gure for a gallon of biofuel. 
•  Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation: Assigning a value to deferred deforestation, 
where deforestation rates are lowered, but permanent 
protection is not guaranteed.
•  Biological offsets (e.g., in agriculture and forestry): 
Defi ning the equivalence of temporary and permanent 
offsets in order to determine how/whether they should be 
tradable within the same market. 
•  Accounting for long-lived versus short-lived forest 
products in land-use change or product-based account-
ing: Determining whether/how carbon emission values 
assigned to long-lived forest products such as timber 
should differ from shorter-term carbon emissions, such 
as those arising through burning, in determining the 
carbon impact of a forestry project. 
•  Allowance banking and borrowing: Determining an 
appropriate rate of trade across time for emissions credits 
that can be banked or borrowed.
The following case studies quantitatively explore the impli-
cations of a positive valuation of temporary storage in two 
contexts: lifecycle GHG accounting for biofuels and 
agricultural offsets accounting. Some thoughts on implica-
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tions of temporary storage valuation for the debate sur-
rounding deferred emissions from REDD mechanisms are 
also introduced in Box 4. 
V. CASE STUDY: BIOFUELS, LIFE CYCLE 
ANALYSIS, AND GREENHOUSE GAS ACCOUNTING
In the United States and elsewhere, biofuels have been 
promoted as an alternative to petroleum-based fuels. The 
anticipated benefi ts include revitalized rural economies, 
increased energy independence, and reduced greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with the transport sector. In recent 
years, however, experts have raised concerns about the 
magnitude of greenhouse gas emissions arising from the 
land-use change associated with the production of biofuel 
feedstocks. These concerns raise questions about the claims 
of greenhouse gas benefi ts associated with biofuel produc-
tion and use (Searchinger et al., 2008). 
The two major regulations supporting biofuels develop-
ment—California’s “Low Carbon Fuel Standard” and the 
U.S. Renewable Fuels Standard—therefore require 
quantifi cation of the greenhouse gas content of the biofuel 
in order to ensure that it satisfi es greenhouse gas require-
ments attached to the law. In both cases, greenhouse gas 
“content” is broadly interpreted to mean a life-cycle-based 
measure of all greenhouse gases emitted throughout the 
production and transport of the fuel and its major inputs. 
The carbon dioxide released when biofuels are combusted 
as fuel is not included in such accounting because it is 
“short-cycle” carbon that was absorbed from the atmo-
sphere as the biofuel feedstock grew. However, other GHG 
emissions arise at several stages in the production of 
biofuels that must be accounted for, including the GHG 
emissions associated with clearing or converting land, 
growing and fertilizing the feedstock, transporting the 
feedstock, and converting the feedstock into fuel.
Until recently, the potential for signifi cant carbon dioxide 
emissions associated with land-use conversion for feed-
stock production was recognized but largely neglected in 
quantifi cation efforts. Recent research reports, however, 
have attempted such quantifi cation, arguing that the 
potential magnitude of these emissions is too signifi cant to 
ignore (Searchinger et al., 2008). Such emissions are 
complicated to quantify, however, in part because carbon 
emissions from land-use change, and the avoided emis-
sions from substituting biofuels for fossil fuels in transport, 
are ongoing over time and can be diffi cult to attribute to 
specifi c policies. Efforts to quantify the net emissions 
associated with land-use change and attribute those 
emissions to current biofuel production or biofuels policy, 
therefore, must utilize an accounting methodology that 
allows for aggregation of such emissions into a single 
fi gure that can be compared across fuels and across other 
policy options for reducing GHG emissions.7 
For such aggregation, it is necessary to select two impor-
tant analytical parameters: (1) a time frame for analysis 
that sets temporal boundaries within which emissions or 
emissions reductions are counted, and (2) some sort of 
weighting scheme that allows the analyst to compare one 
unit of emissions (or displaced emissions) that occurs 
today with a similar unit that occurs at variable points in 
the future. These parameters are familiar in economic 
analyses. In cost/benefi t analysis they are referred to as the 
“amortization period” and the “discount rate,” and they 
represent critical policy decisions about the relevant time 
frame for analysis and how future emissions (or savings) 
will be valued relative to those today. 
In its proposed rule for calculating the greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with a gallon of biofuel, as required 
by the Energy Independence and Security Act’s Renew-
able Fuel Standard, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency proposed two possible methods to handle time in 
the aggregation of carbon emissions. In the fi rst scenario, 
carbon costs (i.e., from land use change) and benefi ts 
(i.e., from displaced petroleum use) are estimated for 30 
years beyond initiation of a biofuel production project. 
These fi gures are then aggregated using a 0 percent 
discount rate to determine net carbon impact over the 
length of the project. The alternative scenario tracked 
carbon costs and benefi ts for 100 years from project 
initiation and discounted them back to the present for 
aggregation using a 2 percent discount rate.
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EPA’s proposed rule broke from economic discounting 
tradition, however, by applying the discount rate directly to 
physical carbon units rather than to the economic impact of 
those emissions. Because discount rates are generally used 
in the context of investment decision making to refl ect the 
“time value of money,” they are usually applied to mon-
etary units, such as costs or benefi ts, rather than to physical 
units such as tons, million metric tons of carbon equivalent 
(MMTCE), or pounds (lbs) per acre. Although the practice 
of applying discount rates directly to physical units to 
estimate the “time value of carbon” in assessing carbon 
mitigation options is becoming more common (Stavins and 
Richards, 2005), a great deal of disagreement exists about 
the validity of applying discounting principles to carbon 
units. 
The purpose of comparing physical carbon emissions in the 
future to physical carbon emissions in the present through 
some sort of discounting procedure is essentially to capture 
how the value of the damage caused by a unit of emissions 
in the future will compare to the value of the damage 
caused by a unit of emissions today (see Box 2). The 
process of applying a discount rate to carbon tonnage is 
therefore a “short cut” to information about how the value 
of damages changes over time that skips the series of 
important steps described above that translates physical 
impacts into economic impacts (Marshall, 2009). 
When transferring the discounting practice over to physical 
units, it is important to recognize that, despite a failure to 
include explicit impact and damage curves in the analysis, 
the time value of carbon refl ected in the discount rate is 
nevertheless a function of underlying cost and benefi t 
relationships, which are assumed to drive changing “carbon 
values” over time. In such studies, the discount rate must 
therefore capture more than just the “time value of money” 
Box 2 | Physical Carbon Discount Rate
A physical carbon discount rate has been proposed for use 
in GHG accounting to weight physical units of GHG 
emissions over time. This rate is used to represent how the 
“values” of emissions compare across time periods when 
aggregating emissions into a single carbon impact figure. 
Suppose an activity or product is going to result in one ton 
of additional emissions each year for 10 years and the task 
is to calculate the carbon impact of that product or activity. 
If it is perceived that units of emissions are equivalent over 
time, then the carbon impact can be estimated at a 0 
percent discount rate (i.e. no change over time) and the 
total impact is calculated to be 10 tons. 
Use of a non-zero physical carbon discount rate, however, 
reflects a perspective that the importance of emissions in 
different time periods changes, so that one ton of emis-
sions ten or twenty years from now should not be treated 
as equivalent to one ton of emissions this year when 
calculating a total impact figure. A physical carbon discount 
rate is applied to a unit of emissions to indicate how much 
weight is attached to that unit of emissions in aggregating 
emissions over time to arrive at a total impact figure. Use 
of a 2% physical carbon discount rate for the GHG 
accounting problem described above results in the 
following carbon impact estimate:
Table 4 | Use of a physical carbon discount rate to 
weight emissions over time in calculating a carbon 
impact estimate.
Year
Net Yearly 
Change
Relative Weight of Emissions with 
2% Physical Carbon Discount Rate
0 1 1.000
1 1 0.980
2 1 0.961
3 1 0.942
4 1 0.924
5 1 0.906
6 1 0.888
7 1 0.871
8 1 0.853
9 1 0.837
Total Impact Estimate
(Sum of weighted emissions) 9.162
The critical question in such an analysis is how to define 
and measure changing values over time for carbon 
emissions, and what that definition says about estimating 
an appropriate physical carbon discount rate. 
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dynamic generally associated with discounting practices. 
An appropriate physical carbon discount function form and 
rate must also refl ect the complicated relationships de-
scribed above among variables such as the rate of change of 
the damages produced by atmospheric GHG stocks (which 
refl ects changing assumptions about available mitigation 
technologies) and the persistence rate of GHGs in the 
atmosphere (Richards, 1997). Simple extrapolations from 
default monetary or market discount rates, or even the lower 
“social rates of time preference” often used in intergenera-
tional analyses, are generally not appropriate.8 
Implications of the SCC Estimates for Selection of a 
Physical Carbon Discount Rate
The implicit purpose of the discount rate when applied to a 
physical carbon unit is to refl ect the relative weights of the 
value of damage done by emissions in each time period. 
The social cost of carbon estimates can therefore be used to 
derive discount rates which, when applied to the physical 
carbon unit, produce a discounted physical carbon fi gure 
that is proportional to the discounted social cost fi gure. 
Such a fi gure can be used to come up with a discounted 
carbon content estimate based on “damage-weighted” 
carbon emissions fi gures for multiple time periods.
As an example, consider the stream of social cost fi gures 
derived in the case of the 2.5 percent discount rate (Table 
5). The second column discounts that SCC back to the 
present year using a 2.5 percent discount fi gure. The third 
column then calculates an index of the weight of damages 
in any given year relative to the damages in year 2010. The 
objective of a physical discount rate in this context is to 
generate a path of physical unit weights that equals the path 
of damage weights relative to the year 2010. If the value of 
damages created by a unit of emissions in year 2030, for 
instance, is one-quarter the value of the damages associated 
with a unit of emissions in year 2010, then the appropriate 
physical discount rate will be one which, when applied to a 
single unit of emissions in year 2030, produces a discounted 
unit weight of 0.25 in the year 2010. The fourth column 
illustrates the path of appropriate physical carbon discount 
rates for this particular path of social costs of carbon.
Table 5 | Calculating a physical carbon discount rate from 
a stream of social cost of carbon values.
Emission 
year 
SCC figure 
for 2.5% 
discount rate 
scenario
NPV of SCC, 
discounted to 
present using 
a 2.5% 
discount rate
Weight of 
damages 
relative to 
year 2010
Physical 
discount 
rate (%)
2010 35.1 35.1 1.000 0.000
2015 38.4 33.9 0.967 0.674
2020 41.7 32.6 0.928 0.749
2025 45.9 31.7 0.903 0.683
2030 50.0 30.5 0.869 0.703
2035 54.2 29.2 0.833 0.734
2040 58.4 27.8 0.793 0.775
2045 61.7 26.0 0.741 0.861
2050 65.0 24.2 0.690 0.933
Note that the appropriate physical discount rate (shown in 
column fi ve) is signifi cantly lower than the economic 
discount rate used in the analysis (which in this case is 2.5 
percent). Furthermore, the schedule of physical discount 
rates to be applied to emissions in the different years is 
non-constant and increasing over time. This dynamic arises 
because the estimated SCC fi gures increase at a declining 
rate over time. 
To illustrate how such discounting fi gures might be applied 
in the context of GHG accounting for biofuels production, 
consider the problem of calculating the GHG impact 
associated with the production of ethanol from an acre of 
land. A very stylized schedule of production emissions 
might appear as shown in Table 6. These fi gures refl ect 
large up-front costs associated with potential carbon 
emissions from land-use change, followed by a stream of 
benefi ts associated with displaced petroleum use from etha-
nol produced on the land for 30 years after conversion. 
According to EPA’s fi nalized rules for the calculation of 
GHG impacts under the Renewable Fuels Standard, such 
emissions should be aggregated over 30 years using a 
discount rate of 0 percent. The calculations shown in Table 
5 suggest that, even with a project period of 30 years, a 
non-zero discount rate is appropriate if the objective of the 
aggregation is to generate a “damage-weighted” total of 
emissions costs and benefi ts over time. The results in Table 
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6 illustrate that the use of this discount schedule discounts 
the stream of future benefi ts suffi ciently to narrow the gap 
between project benefi ts and costs (from a net benefi t of 
3.5 in the undiscounted case to just 1.1 in the discounted 
case). As one might expect, use of a physical discount rate 
could tip the comparison so that costs exceed benefi ts if the 
physical emissions and savings fi gures are suffi ciently 
close in the un-discounted case. Table 7 illustrates a case 
where a project with net benefi ts of 1.5 in the un-discount-
ed case becomes undesirable, with a net benefi t of -0.8, in 
the discounted case. 
In this analysis, the discounted case accounts for the fact 
that there is a foregone storage benefi t associated with the 
release of large amounts of carbon at the front end of the 
project through land-use change. Use of the discount rate 
therefore narrows the margins of benefi ts for the project 
relative to the case where the value of temporary storage is 
not accounted for.
VI. CASE STUDY: BIOLOGICAL OFFSETS AND 
TEMPORARY CARBON STORAGE VALUE
As potential designs for climate legislation are debated in 
the United States, one central area of discussion has been 
about the extent to which the agricultural and forestry 
sectors can or should be involved as a source of offset 
credits for capped sectors under a climate bill. Offset 
credits represent reductions in an uncapped sector that can 
be sold into a capped sector and substituted for required 
reductions. Proponents argue that there are many sources 
of “low hanging fruit” within agriculture and forestry 
where sequestration could occur at relatively low cost and 
that such reductions would help keep the costs of compli-
Table 6 | Using a physical carbon discount rate, derived from the social cost of carbon, to weight carbon 
units over time (using estimates derived with a 2.5 percent discount rate).
 Year
Costs: emissions 
(TCO2e)
Benefits: avoided 
emissions from 
petroleum use (TCO2e)
Schedule of 
physical carbon 
discount rates
Discounted costs 
(TCO2e)
Discounted benefits 
(TCO2e)
2010 20.0 0.0 0.000 20.000 0.000
2011 5.0 2.0 0.777 4.961 1.985
2012 4.0 2.0 0.653 3.948 1.974
2013 3.0 2.0 0.715 2.937 1.958
2014 2.0 2.0 0.685 1.946 1.946
2015 1.0 2.0 0.674 0.967 1.934
2016 0.1 2.0 0.716 0.096 1.916
2017 0.1 2.0 0.713 0.095 1.903
2018 0.1 2.0 0.714 0.094 1.889
2019 0.1 2.0 0.746 0.094 1.871
2020 0.1 2.0 0.749 0.093 1.856
2021 0.1 2.0 0.733 0.092 1.846
2022 0.1 2.0 0.703 0.092 1.839
2023 0.1 2.0 0.698 0.091 1.827
2024 0.1 2.0 0.697 0.091 1.815
2025 0.1 2.0 0.683 0.090 1.806
2026 0.1 2.0 0.687 0.090 1.792
2027 0.1 2.0 0.692 0.089 1.779
2028 0.1 2.0 0.687 0.088 1.768
2029 0.1 2.0 0.694 0.088 1.754
2030 0.1 2.0 0.703 0.087 1.739
 Total 36.5 40   36.129 37.196
Net benefits 3.5    1.066
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ance with climate legislation low within the capped sector 
while providing additional income opportunities for the 
agricultural and forestry sectors. Some policymakers are 
particularly enthusiastic about the potential for sequester-
ing carbon in terrestrial ecosystems through an increase in 
biomass or soil organic carbon (van Kooten, 2008).
Such offset opportunities, termed “biological” or “seques-
tration” offsets, differ fundamentally from other potential 
offset opportunities within agriculture, however. Offsets 
generated from the use of methane digesters, changes in 
fertilizer use, and other agricultural practices represent 
emissions reductions that are permanent; future changes 
in practices will not re-emit the carbon reductions 
achieved through use of the technology or practice. 
Biological sequestration projects can make no such 
guarantee. Forests grown this year for sequestration 
purposes, for instance, could be harvested in 30 years if 
timber market prices change or could accidentally burn 
and release stored carbon as a result of natural processes. 
Because biological sequestration cannot guarantee 
permanent storage, it is diffi cult to defi ne how such 
biological offsets “stack up” against permanent reduc-
tions in meeting emissions reductions goals for climate 
policy. Defi ning some measure of equivalence between 
permanent reductions and biological offsets, however, is 
critical to designing offset markets that allow one to be 
traded for the other.
The “permanence” issue in the biological offsets debate 
addresses the question of how policy can be designed to 
ensure that activities that are inherently impermanent can 
Table 7 | Example of a scenario where the project is desirable when carbon is not discounted, but where 
costs exceed benefits when carbon is discounted using a physical carbon discount rate based on the SCC 
(using estimates derived with a 2.5 percent discount rate).
Costs: emissions 
(TCO2e)
Benefits: avoided 
emissions from 
petroleum use (TCO2e)
Schedule of 
physical carbon 
discount rates
Discounted costs 
(TCO2e)
Discounted benefits 
(TCO2e)
2010 20.0 0.0 0.000 20.000 0.000
2011 5.0 1.9 0.777 4.961 1.885
2012 4.0 1.9 0.653 3.948 1.875
2013 3.0 1.9 0.715 2.937 1.860
2014 2.0 1.9 0.685 1.946 1.849
2015 1.0 1.9 0.674 0.967 1.837
2016 0.1 1.9 0.716 0.096 1.820
2017 0.1 1.9 0.713 0.095 1.808
2018 0.1 1.9 0.714 0.094 1.795
2019 0.1 1.9 0.746 0.094 1.777
2020 0.1 1.9 0.749 0.093 1.763
2021 0.1 1.9 0.733 0.092 1.753
2022 0.1 1.9 0.703 0.092 1.747
2023 0.1 1.9 0.698 0.091 1.736
2024 0.1 1.9 0.697 0.091 1.724
2025 0.1 1.9 0.683 0.090 1.716
2026 0.1 1.9 0.687 0.090 1.703
2027 0.1 1.9 0.692 0.089 1.690
2028 0.1 1.9 0.687 0.088 1.680
2029 0.1 1.9 0.694 0.088 1.666
2030 0.1 1.9 0.703 0.087 1.652
 Total 36.5 38   36.129 35.336
Net benefits   1.5     -0.794
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generate offset credits that are considered equivalent, by 
some defi nition, to permanent reductions. Proposed 
institutional design solutions to this problem have 
included: permanent enforcement, continuous liability 
rules, credit discounting, ton-year accounting, minimum 
period for project lifetime, temporary “Certifi ed Emis-
sions Reductions” (CERs), buffers for risk management, 
and annually rented credits of some kind (Blanco and 
Forner, 2000; Fearnside, 2008; Sedjo and Marland, 2003; 
Bigsby, 2009). 
There are two different approaches to the design of 
solutions to permanence issues with respect to biological 
offsets. One approach considers temporary offsets to be 
simply an interim storage mechanism that is just one part 
of a permanent sequestration path. According to this 
approach, the challenge to solving the permanence 
problem is ensuring that when and if the biological offset 
project “reverses” and re-emits its stored carbon, the 
purchaser of the temporary credit takes measures to 
ensure re-sequestration through either another temporary 
credit or a permanent reduction elsewhere. Sedjo and 
Marland (2003) refl ect this approach in describing the 
problem of permanence in the offsets markets as a 
liability issue. The question is not whether carbon can be 
stored indefi nitely using a particular technology or 
practice, but whether liability can be maintained indefi -
nitely so that reversals must be compensated for and the 
stream of sequestration maintained intact, though the 
form of that sequestration may vary with time. 
Institutional solutions such as annually rented credits and 
permanent liability rules approach the problem from this 
perspective. The underlying theory is straightforward: 
permanent liability leads to permanent sequestration. A 
regulated party can meet its compliance obligation by 
renting annual credits, but eventually will have to satisfy 
that liability by investing in permanent reductions within 
its facilities or through the purchase of an emissions 
allowance or another temporary offset credit. In practice, 
however, ensuring that liability will extend indefi nitely 
into the future is extremely complex. Companies go out 
of business, regulations change, and enforcement resourc-
es are limited. Additional institutional refi nements 
attempt to deal with these risks through mechanisms such 
as credit buffer reserves and compliance obligations 
under climate policy to insure against future losses. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental premise of this approach—
that if companies are allowed to hold temporary credits 
some mechanism needs to be in place to monitor them, 
possibly indefi nitely, to ensure those temporary credits 
eventually become permanent—may be untenable, and, if 
you subscribe to the second approach to temporary credit 
design, unnecessary.
The second, alternative approach to temporary credits 
argues that it should be possible to defi ne some measure of 
“equivalence” between temporary credits and permanent 
reductions that can be used to determine how temporary 
credits of different lengths of time compare in effectiveness 
to permanent reductions. Equivalence could be defi ned by 
a specifi ed duration period, for instance, so that any offset 
generated by a storage project that lasts 50 years is 
equivalent to a permanent reduction today. Ton-year 
accounting is a commonly used accounting method that 
relies upon a determination of equivalence duration such as 
this (see Box 3).
The relative values derived from the ton-year method, 
however, are highly sensitive to the equivalence duration 
chosen; the longer the equivalence duration, the less value 
is awarded to temporary storage. There is a great deal of 
debate about whether a 100-year assumption is appropriate 
or arbitrary, but it has the advantage of being consistent 
with the construction of the Global Warming Potential 
indices that are used to determine equivalence among the 
impacts of different greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere 
(Herzog et al., 2003). 
Implications of Social Cost of Carbon Estimates for 
Equivalence Estimates
Like discounting physical carbon in the context of biofuel 
GHG accounting, the equivalence concept introduced here, 
though often measured in physical units such as ton-years, 
can be interpreted as a shortcut for comparing the value of 
damages done by emissions in different time periods. In 
the context of temporary credits, a permanent reduction can 
be said to be equivalent to the number of temporary 
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reductions that provide an equivalent level of damage 
reduction. Theoretically, if used as a trading ratio between 
permanent and temporary credits, that ratio should create 
an equivalence relationship that yields a comparable 
impact between permanent reduction and the requisite 
number of temporary credits, and ensures that the respec-
tive market prices refl ect the relative impacts of temporary 
versus permanent storage.
As an example, consider the 5 percent discount rate 
scenario shown in Table 1 (which illustrates the net 
present value [NPV] fi gures for the social cost of carbon 
estimates). Those estimates suggest that a ton of carbon 
dioxide emitted in 2010 generates $4.70 worth of dam-
ages. Determining an appropriate trading ratio with 
temporary credits would require calculating, for each 
potential project duration, the number of temporary 
credits required for the NPV of the avoided damages from 
those temporary credits to be equivalent to $4.70 per ton 
of carbon dioxide. Consider that a ton of carbon dioxide 
emitted in 2050 is estimated to generate $2.23 worth of 
damage. The value of sequestering that ton, in terms of 
avoided damages, from 2010 to 2050 is therefore $4.70 - 
$2.23 = $2.47 (Table 3). When using a 5 percent discount 
rate, a permanent reduction of one ton of carbon in 2010 
is therefore equivalent to 4.70 / 2.47 = 1.9 tons of 40-year 
storage, or permanently reducing a unit of carbon in 2010 
is equivalent, in terms of the value of damages avoided, 
Box 3 | Ton-Year Accounting
The ton-year accounting method is one method often 
proposed as a way to compare the value of temporary 
storage to a permanent reduction or to other storage 
projects of different durations. This method relies on an 
underlying duration equivalence assumption, often 100 
years, that essentially asserts that storage of 100 years or 
longer is considered permanent and therefore equivalent to 
a permanent reduction (Herzog et al., 2003; Fearnside, 
2002a). Storage of less than 100 years is discounted. 
Herzog et al. (2003) explain “the ‘discount’ for non-perma-
nent storage is based on differences in the integrated 
atmospheric carbon over the 100 years from a pulse of 
carbon removed from the atmosphere at time t = 0 and 
re-emitted to the atmosphere at time t = T based on a 
simulation of a carbon cycle model” (Figure 2).
Note that due to degradation in the atmosphere, a 
permanent reduction is considered equivalent to 46 
ton-years, given a 100-year frame of consideration. In 
contrast, a ton of carbon stored in a forestry project and 
released in year 50 has a ton-year benefit equal to the 
difference between emitting the unit now (46 ton-years) 
and emitting the unit in year 50 (28 ton-years), or 18 
ton-years. Such a project would therefore be credited with 
18 ton-years of storage, versus a permanent reduction that 
is credited with 46 ton-years of storage.
Figure 2 | The impact of a unit of emissions in year 
0 (as measured in ton-years and shown in Panel A) is 
compared to the impact of a unit of emissions in year 50 
(Panel B; Fearnside et al., 2000).
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to temporarily storing 1.9 units of carbon dioxide from 
2010 to 2050. 
As one would expect, the equivalence ratios for shorter 
projects are much higher than they are for longer projects. 
In the case of ten-year storage credits, for instance, the 
benefi t of the storage is only $4.70 - $4.17 = $0.53 per ton 
of carbon sequestered. One would therefore need to 
purchase 9.0 (4.7 / 0.53) temporary, ten-year storage credits 
in order to avoid the same amount of damage as permanent 
reduction avoids. The equivalence trading ratios calculated 
for each discounting scenario are shown in 8. 
 Table 8 | Equivalence trading ratios for temporary credits 
of different durations and under different discounting 
scenarios. 
Year of temporary 
credit expiration
5% discount 
rate (Average)
3% discount 
rate (Average)
2.5% discount 
rate (Average)
2010 N/A N/A N/A
2015 20.10 24.60 30.30
2020 8.95 11.70 13.91
2025 6.22 8.91 10.30
2030 4.50 6.61 7.65
2035 3.37 5.09 5.98
2040 2.67 4.08 4.84
2045 2.21 3.32 3.86
2050 1.90 2.80 3.22
These estimates suggest that as the discount rate used 
decreases, the necessary trading ratio between temporary 
credits and permanent reductions increases. This is because 
as the discount rate decreases, damages from future 
emissions are discounted less. If future emissions have 
higher relative damages, then the value of temporary 
storage goes down, as does the value of temporary storage 
credits relative to permanent reductions (see note 6).
VII. UNCERTAINT Y AND THE VALUE OF 
TEMPORARY CARBON STORAGE
Thus far, average values have been used to illustrate the 
value of temporary carbon storage derived from the 
interagency working group social cost of carbon numbers. 
It is important to consider, however, that the social cost of 
carbon estimation effort produces a full range, or distribu-
tion, of potential impacts and costs, from which is derived 
a single average cost estimate. Averages are one method 
used to “represent” a full distribution of results; they have 
the advantage of being commonly used and easily under-
stood as one method of representing the “center” of a 
distribution. Averages are so common, in fact, that repre-
senting a distribution of potential estimates through the use 
of an average (or a median—another measure of the 
“center” of a distribution) is often taken for granted as 
being appropriate across policy contexts.
In fact, use of the average to represent a distribution of 
results is a policy decision that refl ects an underlying 
attitude toward the uncertainty associated with the distribu-
tion of outcomes. Consider that using the time path of aver-
age damages for a given discounting scenario to represent 
future costs means that, even if you accept the range of 
modeled outcomes as a reasonable range of outcomes, 
there is a 50 percent probability that social costs of carbon 
in any time period exceed the costs that have been selected 
as representative for regulatory purposes. There is also, of 
course, a 50 percent probability that social costs of carbon 
in any time period are lower than those costs. While risk is 
symmetric, however, theories of risk aversion have 
consistently demonstrated that individuals’ perception of 
risk may not be symmetric; individuals often perceive the 
risks of increased costs (the down-side risk) differently 
than they perceive the up-side risks, or the possibility that 
costs will not be as high as the expected cost refl ected in 
the average. “Risk aversion” refers to a willingness to pay 
to avoid down-side risk; in the case of policy design based 
on a social cost of carbon, a policy refl ecting a greater 
degree of risk aversion might choose a social cost of 
carbon value in the upper tail of the cost distribution as the 
basis of its policy design in order to reduce the down-side 
risk associated with the policy outcome.
Anda et al. (2009) argue that there are other reasons that 
conventional expected values, or averages, may not be the 
appropriate fi gure upon which to base policy design in the 
case of projected climate change outcomes: “the conven-
tional approach does not account for the presence of 
thresholds in the concentration-response function and the 
risk of global catastrophic climate events that, though 
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Box 4 | Temporary Storage and the REDD Debate
The combined effects of deforestation, forest degradation, 
and peatland emissions are estimated to generate 8–20 
percent of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
(van der Werf et al., 2009). Actions to reduce deforestation 
will therefore be an important part of any strategy to avoid 
catastrophic climate change. Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) is a proposed 
framework under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to encourage developing coun-
tries to reduce forest-related emissions. One element of the 
REDD framework will likely include providing a financial 
incentive for emissions reductions that occur as a result of 
actions taken to slow rates of deforestation and forest 
degradation. 
One of the debates in the international negotiations on 
REDD is whether the emissions reductions generated 
through such actions could be used by countries with 
emissions reductions targets to meet their obligations 
under an international climate change agreement. Under 
such a system, developed countries could offset part of 
their emission reduction obligations by buying emissions 
reductions generated by REDD actions in tropical forest 
countries. While such a mechanism could be structured so 
that payments are negotiated and transferred at the 
project level, like a large international offset program, 
current discussions are focused on having the system 
operate at the national level, where countries themselves 
generate tradable carbon credits in exchange for lowering 
their national deforestation rate below a defined baseline 
level. 
Much of the debate surrounding the legitimacy of the GHG 
reductions achievable through a REDD mechanism raises 
questions related to the permanence of reductions achieved 
through changes in forest management. The permanence 
issue arises because, like all other biological sequestration 
methods, changes in forest management result in seques-
tration that can ultimately be reversed, either naturally 
through wildfire, for instance, or through anthropogenic land 
use change.i The incentives provided by a REDD mechanism 
may therefore defer, but perhaps not ultimately avoid, 
deforestation and release of stored carbon. 
Another active area of discussion is the potential for 
“leakage” of emissions associated with changing patterns of 
land use arising as a result of GHG mitigation projects. 
“Leakage” refers to the possibility that increased protection 
of forests in one area will lead to increased pressure on, 
and increased deforestation of, forests in another area. With 
high levels of leakage, carbon credits generated by the 
initial forest protection program could overestimate actual 
aggregate reductions in emissions; a portion of the 
emissions counted as reduced have in fact shifted geo-
graphically. While permanence is concerned with the extent 
to which emissions are avoided versus simply displaced in 
time, leakage is concerned with the extent to which 
emissions are avoided versus simply displaced in space.
In the case of a project-level REDD mechanism, the 
implications of the SCC figures for the negotiated contracts 
between forest owners and international buyers are the 
same as those described in the section on biological 
offsets; a trading ratio between the impermanent carbon 
characterized by a low probability of occurrence, would 
lead to signifi cant economic damage.” This argument 
builds on the work of Tol (2003) and Weitzman (2007) in 
making the case that averaging climate outcomes may not 
be an appropriate tool when analyzing irreversible process-
es with “heavy-tailed” distributions—or distributions with 
a large amount of weight in one tail rather than in the 
center. They suggest that under circumstances where the 
risk of irreversible climate catastrophe creates a heavy 
upper tail in the distribution of potential climate change 
costs, climate policy should be designed to “hedge against 
the risk that greenhouse gas emissions will lead to catastro-
phe” (Anda et al., 2009). 
In the presence of irreversibility, hedging against future 
catastrophic risk entails recognizing the additional value 
associated with keeping policy options open and maintain-
ing the fl exibility to adjust policies in response to new 
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credits from sequestration and the credits obtained from 
permanent reductions or avoided emissions can capture the 
relative difference in magnitude of damages avoided.ii The 
length of the contract agreed upon will determine the 
appropriate trading ratio. Note that a trading ratio as 
described addresses the permanence issue through its 
proposed definition of equivalence, but it does not address 
the issue of leakage.
A REDD mechanism operating at the national level, on the 
other hand, addresses within-country emissions leakage 
risk by generating credits based on the performance of the 
entire country, rather than on a project-by-project basis. A 
country’s performance would be measured relative to a 
national established baseline for deforestation rates; the 
methodology for determining national baselines that seems 
to be generating the most discussion is one based on a 
multi-year average of historical deforestation rates.iii As in 
the case of the project-level REDD mechanism, trading 
ratios could be used at the national level to ensure some 
level of equivalence between the deferred carbon release 
purchased from developing countries through the REDD 
offset mechanism and the permanent reductions that are 
foregone in developed countries. 
The use of a trading ratio absolves developing countries of 
the liability to replace temporary credits when they expire by 
ensuring that multiple temporary storage credits offset an 
equivalent amount of damage to permanent reductions.iv 
Awarding value to fixed-length contracts, while at the same 
time recognizing them as fixed-length and therefore of 
variable carbon-mitigation value depending on the length of 
the storage period, may help find middle ground between 
source country concerns about national sovereignty over 
natural resources and environmental concern about the 
integrity of the credits sold.
Notes
i. Ebeling and Yasue (2008) argue that reducing deforestation 
rates is as “permanent” as fossil fuel–use reductions, 
which still leave the fuel in the ground for possible later 
use. If all fossil fuels are ultimately going to be exploited, 
then any current reduction measure is actually a deferral 
of use. They argue that the value of such reductions lies 
in how they impact the timing of emissions: “In fact, a 
time delay in emissions through temporary abatement 
measures results in permanent climate benefits because 
the cumulative atmospheric concentrations of GHGs will 
be lower at any future point in time.” Note the distinction 
between permanent sequestration and permanent benefits; 
the argument is that non-permanent sequestration can still 
provide permanent benefits. The value of temporary storage 
of carbon reflects those permanent benefits.
ii. Under project-level mechanisms the baseline against which 
emissions removals are measured over time is the estimated 
amount of emissions that would have been expected under a 
“business-as-usual scenario.” Put another way, these are the 
emissions expected in the absence of the project activity (in 
this case, avoiding deforestation).
iii. There are objections to establishing a baseline this way, 
largely based on the fact that deforestation patterns do not 
tend to stay constant over a country’s history, even in a 
“business-as-usual” situation. Observed “forest transitions” 
at the national level suggest that a dynamic baseline should 
reflect decreasing deforestation rates over time and with 
development. The myriad difficulties associated with 
selecting a baseline are not the topic of this paper, however.
iv. This structure is in contrast to the temporary credits 
generated by land use, land-use change, and forestry 
(LULUCF) activities under the E.U. Emission Trading 
Scheme. Under the LULUCF structure, governments 
assume liability to replace or renew temporary LULUCF 
credits once they expire; offset credits used in conjunction 
with ongoing liability for permanent reduction represent 
interim carbon storage mechanisms rather than the 
temporary storage mechanisms described in this paper.
knowledge that narrows uncertainty in the future (Anda et 
al., 2009). An approach to climate policy that recognizes 
the importance of option value may conclude that it is 
appropriate to adopt additional policy costs in order to 
maintain policy fl exibility; in the context of policy designs 
based on social cost of carbon estimates, decision makers 
may again decide to use social cost of carbon estimates in 
the upper tail of the distribution, rather than at the center, 
as one method of hedging against the risk of catastrophic 
collapse in the future.9 
In either case, the task of calculating the appropriate 
expenditure as a risk premium or hedge against catastroph-
ic change is well beyond the scope of this analysis. Howev-
er, the working group presented a set of upper-tail social 
cost of carbon estimates that can be used to illustrate the 
implications in different policy contexts of using more 
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conservative, upper-tail estimates of social cost of carbon 
than the average fi gures used earlier. In the case of a 3 
percent discount rate, the working group presents both the 
average and the 95th percentile estimate. The 95th percentile 
estimate represents the SCC level that separates the lower 
95 percent of the distribution of possible SCC outcomes 
from the upper 5 percent. By defi nition, this fi gure is 
substantially higher than the average social cost of carbon 
in every time period; less intuitively, in this particular case, 
the spread of the social cost of carbon distribution increas-
es at the same rate as the mean, so that the ratio of the 95th 
percentile to the arithmetic mean remains roughly constant 
(Table 9).
 Table 9 | Estimates at different points in the outcome 
distribution for the 3 percent discount rate scenario.
Year
3% discount 
rate 
(Average)
3% discount rate 
(95th percentile)
3% discount rate 
(Ratio of 95th to 
Average)
2010 21.4 64.9 3.0
2015 23.8 72.8 3.1
2020 26.3 80.7 3.1
2025 29.6 90.4 3.1
2030 32.8 100.0 3.0
2035 36.0 109.7 3.0
2040 39.2 119.3 3.0
2045 42.1 127.8 3.0
2050 44.9 136.2 3.0
The roughly constant relationship between the 95th percen-
tile and the mean has signifi cant implications for the use of 
the 95th percentile rather than the mean in both the biofuels 
and the agricultural offsets cast studies. Calculation of both 
the SCC-equivalent physical carbon discount rate and a 
permanence equivalence ratio for temporary offset credits 
depends on ratios calculated from the path of social cost of 
carbon values over time. If the path of the 95th percentile 
estimates over time is an exact multiple of the path of 
average estimates over time, then the multiplier cancels out 
in calculating the relevant ratios along the 95th percentile 
path, and the ratios used to calculate the physical carbon 
discount rate and the appropriate offset trading ratio are 
exactly the same as those calculated using the average 
path. In other words, carbon storage values are derived 
from relative cost of carbon estimates over time, not from 
the absolute estimates themselves. Therefore, if the 
absolute social cost of carbon estimates found at different 
certainty levels along the outcome distribution all increase 
at the same rate over time, there will be no difference in the 
temporary storage values calculated using different levels 
of certainty.
The current social cost of carbon estimates come very close 
to replicating that scenario, though one can see from Table 
8 that the 95th percentile estimates diverge slightly from a 
fi xed ratio for the years 2015–2025. Although the modest 
divergence present in the existing estimates is likely a 
modeling artifact, and there is not enough information in 
the SCC documentation to attribute the divergence to 
specifi c input structures or assumptions, it is nevertheless 
instructive to explore the implications of the divergence in 
the different policy contexts described here. In future 
studies, increased focus specifi cally on how the distribution 
of potential cost estimates changes over time will help 
clarify the relationship between uncertainty of input param-
eters, uncertainty of outputs, and the implications for 
policy based on a temporary storage value analysis.
In the context of physical carbon discounting, the fact that 
the 95th percentile estimates are slightly higher than 
proportional over a portion of the path refl ects that the SCC 
values do not decline as quickly early in the time horizon, 
then decline faster in later years in order to become 
proportional again (Figure 3). The ratio of damages relative 
to year 1 is therefore higher in the early years for the 95th 
percentile (Figure 4). The result is a slightly lower damage-
equivalent physical carbon discount rate for emissions 
occurring early in the time horizon when the 95th percentile 
estimates are used.
In the context of calculating trading ratios for agricultural 
offsets, the fact that the 95th percentile SCC estimates stay 
proportionately higher early in the time horizon means that 
the value of temporary credits that expire in those time 
periods is relatively lower in the case of the 95th percentile 
than in the average case. Therefore, for those time periods 
in which higher than proportional estimates are maintained, 
more temporary credits will be required in order to reach 
equivalence with the benefi ts achieved through a perma-
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nent reduction than are required in the average estimates 
case (Figure 5).
It is important to reiterate that the results illustrated here 
derive from the fact that the 95th percentile estimates stay 
close to a fi xed multiple of the average estimates. These 
results highlight that the critical element in an examination 
of the relative value of the temporary storage of carbon is 
the ratio of SCC costs at some point in the future to the 
current costs; even though absolute SCC costs along the 
95th percentile are much higher than those along the 
average, the value of temporary storage relative to a 
permanent reduction is similar along the two paths because 
they are close to fi xed multiples of each other. Future 
Figure 3 | SCC estimates at the 95th percentile versus a fixed multiple of the average estimates.
Figure 4 | SCC Ratio of discounted damages from emissions in any year relative to those in year 1 (2010) and the resulting 
damage-equivalent physical carbon discount rate.
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research on this relationship will be useful to determine 
how sensitive such results are to modeling structures and 
input parameter uncertainty. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The federal interagency task force estimates of social cost 
of carbon suggest that it is possible to achieve permanent 
climate benefi ts from carbon storage projects that do not 
necessarily ensure permanent reductions or sequestration. 
While these estimates are, of course, sensitive to the 
methodologies used to calculate them—as well as to a 
number of assumptions about projected emissions paths, 
damage functions over time, economic growth paths, and 
other factors—it is instructive to understand the implica-
tions of non-zero temporary carbon storage values across a 
number of policy arenas.
A couple of broad generalizations emerge from an exami-
nation of the social cost of carbon numbers themselves. Of 
critical signifi cance in most policy arenas is the fact that 
temporary storage value is highly sensitive to the length of 
storage as well as to the weighting structure used to 
aggregate and compare the monetized costs and benefi ts 
associated with climate change over time. Though such 
generalizations are intuitive, illustrating this sensitivity 
using available numbers highlights the importance of 
incorporating such considerations into policy design (in the 
case of sensitivity to project duration) and transparent 
policy decision making (in the case of discount rate 
selection) when dealing with issues related to temporary 
carbon storage. 
The question of how the value of temporary storage 
compares to that of permanent reductions is a fundamental 
issue across a number of current, and contentious, policy 
debates. Relevant policy arenas range from carbon markets 
concerned with fungibility of credits for temporary storage 
to life-cycle analysis of the GHG content of a product 
whose emissions benefi ts or costs play out over time. This 
paper presents approaches to using the new social cost of 
carbon estimates to address such questions in the context of 
biological offsets and the life-cycle analysis of the GHG 
content of biofuels. This paper, and the methodologies it 
presents, is designed to advance the dialogue in these areas 
by clarifying the concepts involved and moving discussion 
beyond theoretical debate to the potential policy applica-
tions of actual estimates. 
The science of carbon cost estimation, however, continues 
to evolve. If such estimates are to be useful in policy 
applications, practical mechanisms for addressing their 
inherent uncertainty will need to be designed. Such 
mechanisms, for instance, could include selection of a 
Figure 5 | Damage equivalent trading ratios calculated at different points within the distribution of possible SCC outcomes.
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non-central estimate to represent the estimated outcome 
distribution in policy design. The distribution of uncer-
tainty around estimates, and how it changes over time, is 
fundamental to the question of how such mechanisms will 
infl uence policy design parameters. More explicit explora-
tion of that uncertainty, and how it changes with model 
structure and input parameter uncertainty structure, will be 
a critical element in future research efforts on temporary 
carbon storage value and policy design.
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ENDNOTES
1. The views expressed are those of the author and should not be 
attributed to the Economic Research Service or to the USDA.
2. The authors use the term “carbon emissions” synonymously with 
“carbon dioxide emissions.” The discussion throughout of carbon 
dioxide emissions also applies more broadly to carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions.
3. Throughout this working paper we refer to the benefits of 
reducing emissions as the value of avoiding the social costs 
associated with a unit of emissions. This figure does not 
incorporate any consideration of the cost of curtailing emissions, 
and should therefore not be considered a net benefit figure. 
Economic theory tells us that the efficient level of regulation 
of carbon will be one leading to an emissions level where the 
marginal cost of a unit of additional abatement is equal to the 
social cost of carbon (i.e., where marginal costs of reduction = 
marginal benefits of reduction).
4. Although not illustrated here, the impact horizon may also 
be measured relative to a fixed end point—i.e., impacts are 
measured through 2100, regardless of when the emission occurs. 
This methodology creates a truncation bias, however, where 
later emissions have lower impact simply because the period 
over which their impacts are measured is truncated (see Marshall 
[2009] for more detail). Such a methodology builds in a bias 
toward declining social costs of carbon.
5. A description of the discounting scenarios used, together with 
an explanation of why they were chosen, is available in the 
documentation of the working group’s efforts and results at 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/
commercial/pdfs/sem_finalrule_appendix15a.pdf. 
6. This result is specific to the particular relationship between 
SCC, growth rate of SCC, and discount rate found within these 
estimates. If the SCC itself is not as sensitive to the discount 
rate used in the first round of discounting (and is therefore 
more similar across discount rates), then it might be feasible to 
see a case where the temporary value of storage increases with 
the discount rate used. In such a scenario, a high discount rate 
decreases the perceived impact of later emissions so heavily that 
it increases the incentive to hold carbon in storage until later 
when it can be released with what is perceived to be far less 
damage. 
7. Net emissions are the total emissions associated with producing 
and using the fuel minus the avoided emissions associated with not 
producing and using an energy-equivalent amount of fossil fuel.
8. Richards (1997) demonstrates that use of monetary or market 
discount rates may be appropriate under very restrictive 
assumptions about the shape of the marginal damage curve from 
carbon emissions and its relationship to atmospheric stocks.
9. Many integrated assessment models (IAMs) have a difficult time 
incorporating a consideration of catastrophic risk into their social 
cost of carbon calculations; use of an upper-tail estimate may also 
attempt to compensate for what is considered to be an inadequate 
representation of catastrophic costs.
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